Understanding the Basra Battles

I was happy to see that Ramzy Baroud’s articles on Iraq are almost as good as his articles on Palestine.  By now, I think it’s obvious to everyone that the corporate media have been doing a good job at covering up the events in Iraq.  Baroud’s article provides insightful analysis; excerpts below:

Regardless of the outcome of the fighting which commenced upon the Iraqi Army’s march to Basra on March 24, and which proved disastrous for Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, we have been repeatedly “informed” of highly questionable assumptions. Most prominent amongst them is that the “firebrand,” “radical” Moqtada Sadr — leader of the millions-strong Shiite Sadr Movement — led a group of “renegades,” “thugs” and “criminals” to terrorize the strategically important city. Naturally Al-Maliki is portrayed as the exact opposite of Sadr. When the former descended into Basra with his 40,000-strong US-trained and equipped legions, we were circuitously told that the long-awaited move was a cause for celebration.

 The media also suggested we had no reason to doubt Al-Maliki’s intentions when he promised to restore “law and order” and “cleanse” the city, or to question his determination when he described the Basra crusade as “a fight to the end.” If anyone was still unsure of Al-Maliki’s noble objectives, they could be reassured by the Bush administration’s repeated verbal backings, one of which described the Basra battle as “a defining moment.”

Indeed.

Reporters parroted such assumptions with little scrutiny. Even thorough journalists seemed oblivious to the known facts: that the Iraqi Army largely consists of Shiite militias affiliated with a major US ally in Iraq, Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim and his Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); that the ISCI’s Al-Badr militias have rained terror on the Iraqi people — mostly Sunnis, but increasingly Shiites as well — for years; that the Sadr movement and the ISCI are in a fierce contest in southern provinces, and that the US allies are losing grounds quickly to the Sadr movement, which might cost them the upcoming provincial elections scheduled for Oct. 1, 2008; that the US wanted to see the defeat and demise of Sadr supporters before that crucial date because a victory for Sadr is tantamount to the collapse of the entire American project (predicated on the need to privatize Iraqi oil and bring about a “soft” portioning of the country).

Hakim is pushing for what is being termed a super Shiite province with its center in Basra; Sadr is demanding a unified Iraq with a strong central government. Hakim wishes to see a permanent American presence in his country; Sadr insists on a short timetable for withdrawal. America’s major quandary is that Sadr reflects the views of most Iraqis.

His possible victory in the south in fair elections could position him as the new nationalist leader, and a unifying force for Iraqis.

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1 Comment »

  1. abufazl said

    Sadr is defenitely moving up, it seems that America can’t accept that. The difference between Maliki is that he will soon be forgotten when his term is up but Sadr is a permanent political figure with universal acceptance. A huge rock in America’s shoe.

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